We document significant momentum effects in the high-tech IPO aftermarket beyond the initial (underpricing) run-up. Cumulative market-adjusted returns (CMARs) reveal a striking pattern. A local peak of just over 10 percent is reached around 20 trading days post-IPO coinciding with the expiry of the "quiet period". A global peak (of about 33 percent) is reached after 105 trading days. The CMAR decays fairly rapidly thereafter possibly in anticipation of the expiry of the six-month lockup period. Further, we find strong evidence of a linkage between technical ex-ante observable variables and the momentum build-up. We conjecture that visceral factors may at least partially underlie the investor behavior that gives rise to the bubble-like CMAR pattern.
(see Loughran and Ritter (2003) ). Therefore we felt that a look at high-tech IPO aftermarket patterns was likely to be instructive and revealing at the possible cost of some generality. 3 In a strictly rational setting, the market-adjusted return series in a post-IPO environment ought to be random. Let's assume that average initial underpricing is driven by economically sound reasons. 4 Once this has been sorted out by the market and given the SEC rules about no new fundamental information release (or the requirement of a 'quiet period') for twenty-five calendar days, there is no obvious rationale for a systematic direction in post-IPO returns.
However, we find significant evidence of momentum beyond the initial (underpricing) run-up. Cumulative market-adjusted returns (CMAR) reveal a striking pattern. A local peak of just over 10 percent is reached around 20 trading days post-IPO coinciding with the expiry of the 'quiet period'. A global peak (of about 33 percent) is reached after 105 trading days. The CMAR decays fairly rapidly thereafter possibly in anticipation of the expiry of the six-month lockup period. The results are especially compelling when the sample is segregated on the basis of the initial (Day 1) market reaction. Not only do the above momentum patterns prevail for each subsample, the CMAR peak is significantly higher for firms who fare well on Day 1. Although the initial market reaction seems to trigger aftermarket momentum, its effect is short lived. We implement a model that relates the probability of crossing a desired return threshold to momentum, fundamental, and IPO contract-specific variables. We show that trading on Day 1 momentum signals achieves considerable separation in the expected probability of crossing the threshold. We conjecture that momentum investing in the post-IPO context is driven at least partially by visceral factors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present research questions and detailed discussion of our results. Section 3 contains concluding comments.
Research Questions and Data Analysis:
Our primary sample was drawn from ipo.com to identify all high-tech IPO firms from 
P it represents the Day t open price of the i th firm and P mt is the corresponding market (Nasdaq) index and t refers to the time from the IPO date.
At the outset, we simply graph the equally-weighted portfolio CMAR in event time for 125 trading days (see Figure 1 ). 6 We choose day 2 as the starting point because we wish to exclude the initial (underpricing) spike and Day 1 effects that might serve to explain post-IPO market patterns. The shape of the graph is rather striking. There appears to be at least prima facie evidence of momentum investing. To our mind, at least two broad research questions arise from observing this CMAR pattern:
1) What economic, institutional and/or behavioral forces underlie momentum investing in the high-tech IPO context?
2) Can this post-IPO momentum be explained and/or exploited using ex-ante observable factors?
The first research question regarding the CMAR pattern in Figure 1 is difficult to address directly. Fortunately, there is an emerging body of literature dealing with IPO aftermarket dynamics that one could draw upon to make some inferences. For instance, the local peak of 10 percent that we observe at 20 trading days post-IPO coincides with the expiry of the 'quiet period' imposed by the SEC. 7 Bradley et al (2003) show that most of the aftermarket abnormal returns for IPO firms, where analyst coverage is initiated immediately, occurs in the run-up to the expiry of the quiet period (see their Figure 1 , page 13). Likewise, in our sample the CMAR jumps by 7.3 percent between post-IPO trading day 13 and 20 even though we do not control for analyst coverage. It is reasonable to assume that underwriters engage in price stabilization activities (of which inducing wider analyst coverage may be an informal part) in the days following the IPO and for our sample at least, they seem to have considerable success.
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There is a drop-off in the CMAR from just over 10 percent to 5.5 percent during the 10 trading days after the quiet period expiration, possibly due to delayed flipping. However, it does not take long for the momentum to build again. After oscillating in the 6-7 percent range for another 20 or so trading days, the CMAR begins to trend sharply upward reaching a peak of 33 percent on trading day 105. The CMAR declines rapidly beyond this peak as we approach the six-month mark or the outer limit of our observation period. The most plausible explanation for the decline is that the market is recognizing the imminent expiration of the standard lock-up period and the probable onset of insider selling. A number of papers have documented high volumes and significantly negative returns on lock-up expiration (see, for example, Field and Hanka (2001)).
We use regression analysis to address the second research question whether post-IPO momentum is explained using ex-ante observable factors. A number of momentum, fundamental and IPO contract-specific explanatory variables are used for the analysis. Our choice of variables may appear to be somewhat ad hoc but this goes with the territory of exploratory research in general (i.e., the anomalies literature) and momentum studies in particular. We believe that our study has generated interesting and provocative results, which are discussed below. into four equal quartile segments (see Table 1 ). Means are calculated for all observations and for each of the four segments. Firms appear to be fairly homogenous with respect to fundamental variables, especially revenue and offer size. However, the initial underpricing and market reaction variables are remarkably different across quartile segments.
We start the analysis with an OLS regression with the six-month CMAR as the dependent variable and all explanatory variables as defined above (see column 2 of Table 2 ). Day 1 adjusted return exerts a positive influence on the six-month CMAR but is only weakly significant. The only variables that are strongly significant are: underwriter reputation and the Internet identification. We interpret this to mean that, as the CMAR graphs suggest, momentum investing begins to wane before the six-month mark is reached. Therefore, any investment strategy built around ex-ante technical factors involves cashing out either once a certain threshold is reached or in any case no later than around 105 trading days after the IPO.
Therefore, following Jaggia and Thosar (2003) , we define an event when the CMAR for a firm exceeds a 25 (or 50) percent threshold at any time over the six-month observation period.
These market-adjusted return thresholds are set arbitrarily but high enough to reflect momentum investing. Recall that we specifically exclude the initial run-up ( The regression results of a logit regression for the 25% and 50% thresholds are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 . None of the fundamental proxies: pre-IPO profitability, revenue, age or size is significant and this is not necessarily surprising because we expect this information to be incorporated in the offer and/or initial market prices. The underwriter reputation variable appears to have a significantly positive impact on post-IPO momentum. This makes sense if the efficacy of price stabilization activity or the potency of analyst recommendations is tied to underwriter prestige. There is mounting evidence that analyst recommendations especially during the late 1990s bubble period were highly optimistic. Also, analysts tend to initiate coverage with a 'buy' or 'strong buy' recommendation (Bradley et al (2003) ). It has been suggested that IPO firms trade off underpricing for favorable analyst coverage (Loughran and Ritter (2003)). We also find that for the 50 percent threshold, identification as an Internet firm within the high-tech context contributes to momentum.
Initial underpricing (our percentage price change variable) has a significantly negative influence on post-IPO momentum. It appears that the market views underpricing as a risk factor rather than a momentum signal. Perhaps our most intriguing finding is that the day 1 adjusted return is a strongly positive predictor of momentum. In order to gauge how useful the factors, identified as significant by our logit model, were in a speculative investment context, we carry out sensitivity analyses on these factors. The results are reported in Table 3 . For example, if all other factors are considered at their overall mean values but the day 1 adjusted return is evaluated sequentially at the means of four quartile segments (see Table 1 ), our model predicts the expected probability of reaching the 25 percent threshold as 55.9 percent for the bottom quartile versus 75.4 percent for the top quartile -a not inconsiderable separation.
Sensitivity results along similar lines are reported for: percentage price change, day 1 volume and underwriter reputation. It is worth noting that day 1 volume, which we categorized as a potential second-order momentum variable, is significant only for the 50 percent threshold.
Apparently high volume on day 1 is not a deterrent to new investors despite claims in the business press of flipping activity by those allocated shares in the IPO. Aggarwal (2003) shows that contrary to popular belief initial flipping volume is quite modest.
For further raw analysis of CMAR, we sort our sample on the basis of day 1 adjusted return and form four equally-weighted event time CMAR portfolios for 125 trading days based on quartile segments (see graphs in Figure 2 ). The first point to note is that the peaks and troughs for the four portfolios largely track each other and bear a close resemblance to the graph for the total sample shown in Figure 1 . 9 The second point is that investors can benefit a great deal if they make their move after observing the day 1 return. All four CMAR series reach their global peaks at approximately the same time: 105 trading days for the top quartile segment (S4) and 112 trading days for the bottom quartile segment (S1). But the difference in magnitude is startling: 53 percent for S4 versus only 15 percent for S1.
To summarize: the CMAR patterns (Figures 1 and 2 ) indicate the presence of momentum investing, the logit regression results imply that ex-ante technical factors such as the day1 adjusted return can be used to predict the momentum (defined as the probability of reaching a pre-specified return threshold) and the sensitivity analysis confirms that the separation between the probability estimates -say between the top and bottom quartile segments for a given factoris large enough to make a difference in devising a trading strategy.
Concluding Comments:
In this paper, we study the phenomenon of momentum investing using a relatively narrow sample of high-tech IPOs launched in the late 1990s. Cumulative market-adjusted returns measured starting from day 2 after the IPO and tracked for six-months reveal a pronounced bubble-like pattern. Our overall findings are largely consistent with various recent studies that have examined IPO aftermarket dynamics such as price effects at quiet period and lock-up expiration. Further analysis with a logit model demonstrates that technical factors observable exante have considerable power in terms of predicting the probability of exceeding pre-specified return thresholds.
Even in the context of our late 1990s sample period, the magnitude and pattern of the CMAR appears anomalous. It almost seems as if there was a bubble within a bubble and the place to look for an explanation is probably somewhere in the burgeoning literature on behavioral finance. 10 We offer some conjectures about the kind of investor behavior that might
give rise to the momentum effects we document without invoking the most widely cited 10 See Barberis and Thaler (2003) for a useful survey.
behavioral models in the finance literature 11 . We choose to do this not because we believe these models do not apply but simply to introduce a new flavor into the mix.
Loewenstein (2000) discusses the role of visceral factors in determining human behavior.
In general, individuals are either in a 'hot' state, where emotions or visceral factors dominate, or a 'cold state' where decisions are guided by rational thought processes. The important psychological insight is the 'empathy gap' between hot and cold states. This means that individuals do not learn from mistakes made while in a hot state and are in a sense prone to repeat them. Loewenstein argues that visceral factors play a critical role in inter-temporal choice and may explain anomalous risk-taking behavior such as the simultaneous purchase of insurance and gambling.
We think it is plausible that visceral factors at least partially underlie momentum investing, which gives rise to bubble-like patterns. In an investment context: hyped-up analyst reports, enthusiastic but not necessarily informative coverage on TV channels, Internet chat rooms and bulletin boards, word of mouth etc. probably induce investors to switch from cold to hot states with predictable consequences for the late comers. Moreover, the so-called empathy gap ensures that even burned investors are unlikely to learn from the experience.
We don't want to make too much of this line of reasoning. It is quite possible that these visceral factors affect only a small proportion of investors and a narrow range of stocks: microcaps, IPOs, takeover targets etc. In any case, it would be nearly impossible to test behavioral hypotheses directly from market data -controlled laboratory experiments may well be the most fruitful way to gain a deeper understanding of this type of investor behavior. And, if
Loewenstein (and others) are right, it may not be enough for finance theorists to build models with dichotomies like: informed versus uniformed, over-confident versus conservative, news Trading Days
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The data are sorted on the basis of day 1 adjusted return to form four equally-weighted event time CMAR portfolios. The portfolios vary consistently on the basis of day 1 adjusted return with the top (bottom) graph representing the top (bottom) quartile segment. As in Figure 1 , the CMAR measure excludes the initial underpricing run-up and the Day 1 market-adjusted return by creating the portfolio on Day 2.
